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I. Introduction 
In 2003, Palestinians took to the street in protest against the public disorder and chaos that had 
reigned in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since the second Intifada as a result of the continuous 
militarization of Palestinian society and the unlawful actions of many armed Palestinian militias. 
The ‘prime minister’ of the Palestinian Authority (PA) at that time, Ahmad Qurei, literally joined 
the demonstration in the street, expressing his support for the protestors’ quest for more public 
safety and order.  
It makes you wonder: who governs the West Bank and Gaza Strip?  
In 2006, when Hamas won the legislative elections and formed a government under Ismail 
Haneyyeh, one of the main sources of conflict between the Hamas-led government and the 
president of the PA was the government’s level of involvement in the PA’s public finance, 
foreign affairs, and security and civil service personnel.  
It makes you wonder.  
In 2012, many Palestinians took to the street to protest against some of the PA’s Prime 
Minister’s (Fayyad) financial policies; in particular his plans to increase the price of certain basic 
goods. President Abbas was quoted talking about a ‘Palestinian Spring’ in sight.  
It makes you wonder.  
Also in 2012, Palestine was referred to by a UNGA resolution as a non-member state, making it 
possible for President Abbas to ratify many international treaties including the Rome Charter 
(ratified in 2014). Changes to official symbols were ordered in 2012 to reflect the switch from 
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the PA to the State of Palestine, but these remained mostly symbolic. Indeed, the travel 
documents issued by the PA (with pre-approved Israeli ID numbers) continue to refer to the PA 
as a result of an Israeli threat not to recognize any travel document that refers to the State of 
Palestine (as Israel alone controls the entry and exit points to and from occupied Palestinian 
territory).   
It makes you wonder.  
In 2014, news headlines referred to an ‘historic’ visit (that ended the following day) by the PA’s 
prime minister, Rami Hamdallah, and a PA cabinet meeting that was held in Gaza after seven 
years of division between PA-Fatah and Hamas, which since then, theoretically, form a 
consensus-government, but in reality the situation is very different. 
It makes you wonder. 
Just recently, a so-called Israeli coordinator in the West Bank and Gaza, ‘Yoaf Poli Mordakhi’1, 
announced that Gaza’s fishing area would be extended for 6 more miles from Gaza’s beach –
resulting in an additional 400 million Shekels to the annual income from fishing in Gaza.  
It makes you wonder. 
This presentation, with its fancy title and sophisticated abstract is an inquiry and investigation 
into this simple question: Who governs the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and how? While the 
question is simple, the answer is very complex. This is because it involves territoriality, 
ethnicity, nationality, religion, services, people, gender, language, IDs and travel documents, 
citizenship status, areas or residence, etc. I do not promise to provide a comprehensive answer, 
but in this presentation I hope to provide possible approaches to the inquiry.  
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There are arguably two ways to look at governance as a process of governing, and as a result, to 
perceive the role of constitutions as a mechanism of decision-making – indispensable for 
governance: Governance is either perceived as government or as effective control.  
Opinions about governance and constitutions affect our views on the place of written 
constitutions; law and the rule of law; the role of judges and jurisprudence; popular involvement 
or marginalization; the place of parliament and the role of otherwise neglected institutions such 
as the presidency; the army or the constitutional court; accountability of the government to its 
domestic constituency and its dependency on international foreign aid policy etc.  
For example, in the literature many criticize the EU’s foreign aid policy which is aimed at 
supporting ‘rule of law’ in Palestine. This is mainly the case because it subscribes to the Oslo 
framework (excluding any consideration of the Israeli occupation as an important variable) and 
because of the increasingly undemocratic character of the PA
2
. Another example is the 
coexistence of the apparently independent judiciary and the adoption of judicial review by a 
Supreme Constitutional Court with the consolidation of the authoritarian character of the PA. 
The schizophrenic approach in legal education to constitutions and governance form another 
example, where theoretical legal and constitutional studies, as well as jurisprudence, remain 
completely disconnected from the reality of power relations.  
While this paper will not address all of these matters, they are mentioned here just as a reminder 
that, despite the theoretical and descriptive character of the presentation, they are nonetheless 
relevant for analytical and comparative purposes, as much as for concrete policy decisions.  
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II. Governance as Government  
There are typically two ways to consider governance as government. One either studies 
constitutions or otherwise one observes the behaviour of the main political actors. Constitutions 
– and, in most countries now, written constitutions – provide a more or less comprehensive 
guideline on ‘who governs’ and on ‘how government functions’. Because of the nature of 
constitutional provisions (as legal provisions generally), we often tend to forget that legal and 
constitutional rules are by definition normative; i.e. instead of describing who governs in reality 
they include a prescription about who ought to govern and how government ought to function. 
This is why interest shifts, as is often the case, to ‘real life’ constitutions, where a different 
narrative exists about who ought to govern based on who governs in reality, and about how 
government ought to function, based on how government actually functions in reality.  
Arguably, these two approaches make sense for a legal positivist and a realist, respectively, with 
consequences for their methodologies and the results of their analyses. For our purposes, this 
distinction will be marginal as we will refer to constitutional principles, rules and institutions that 
are consolidated by the actions of main political actors. Most importantly, I will not attempt to 
make the distinction between a positivist and a realist approach, because these two approaches 
fail to provide a coherent and comprehensive account of governance and because ‘governance as 
government’ simply did not work in Palestine for reasons that I will explore below. The 
following sections outline the main characteristics of the ‘kind of government’ – which is a 
larger category than the ‘system of government’ which is prevalent in constitutional studies – 
that determines the identity of who governs
3
.   
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2.1. A Unitary Government  
The Oslo Agreements referred to the West Bank and Gaza Strip as one political unit. The PA 
acted accordingly by declaring ‘legal and legislative unification’ as an overarching policy4. The 
Basic Law
5
 of the PA endorses such a unitary-like government when limiting the legislative, 
executive and judicial powers to unitary organs: one president, one Palestinian Legislative 
Council (PLC), one government, and one judiciary. Interestingly enough, a federalist structure – 
or any similar kinds of arrangements for power sharing – between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
for example – was never on the table.  
2.2. A Decentralized Government  
The PA adopted ‘decentralization’ and implemented municipalities as the unique level of ‘local 
government’, as well as establishing a ministry for local government. Elections took place at the 
local level and a new municipality law was adopted which listed the prerogatives of the 
municipalities.    
2.3. A Territorially Defined Government  
The West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip are referred to in international law as 
occupied Palestinian territory. The PA government is not a PLO-like government with a 
liberation agenda. It does not pretend to be representative of Palestinians world-wide. Instead, it 
is a territorially defined government. Although the Basic Law does not define the borders, it is 
assumed that the territory of the PA is the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza 
Strip – even if in reality its jurisdiction is limited as a result of the occupation.  
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2.4. An ‘Autonomous’ Government  
The Oslo Agreements do not refer to the State of Palestine – there is no evidence that it was even 
considered by the Israeli side as a possible outcome of the negotiations in the first place. Instead, 
reference was made to ‘self-government’ authority and to ‘autonomous territories’6.    
2.5. Democratic Government  
There is no consensus about what democracy means. It is often the case that a distinction is made 
between formal and substantial democracy. A formal conception of democracy is narrow and is 
often presented as meaning a system of government where free elections take place and where 
decisions in government depend on majoritarian choices. A substantial conception of democracy 
often includes guarantees for political minorities, where periodic elections ensure alteration in 
majorities and minorities in ways that justify the consideration of majority choices as a basis for 
decisions in government. It is safe to argue that – based on the approach of governance as 
government – the Palestinian Authority passes the test of democracy, formally or substantially 
conceived.   
2.6. Representative Government  
Democracy is rarely exercised directly by the people, but indirectly through representatives. The 
PA is no different. Presidential and legislative elections took place in 1996 and in 2005-6. The 
PLC was mandated with the power to legislate. In cases of necessity, the President can adopt 
decree-laws, subject to confirmation by the PLC. The government needs the confidence of the 
PLC and is subject to possible withdrawal of confidence.  
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2.7. Constitutional Government  
The PA adopted a written and unified constitution called the Basic Law. Despite possible 
critiques of the way the Basic Law was endorsed, the organ that adopted it, and its contradictory 
provisions, the intention of the drafters, the content of the text, and the way the main political 
and judicial actors implemented it, suggest that it is treated as a written constitution; it enjoys a 
hierarchically superior status compared to other legal sources. Once it came into force in 2002, it 
was never publically defied as irrelevant or unimportant – although sometimes it was not 
applied. It was amended twice (in 2003 and 2005) by respecting the procedures for constitutional 
amendments included in the text of the Basic Law.  
2.8. Limited Government  
The Basic Law adopts the separation of powers as a principle and the specific arrangements of 
government reflect that kind of power sharing – which is the basis of a limited government. It is 
safe to suggest that the PA’s system of government cannot be considered as a UK-like 
parliamentarism or a US-like presidentialism. There are similarities with what is often referred to 
as a semi-presidential regime. In Palestine, however, and contrary to France for example, the 
president is not part of the Council of Ministers and alone enjoys the power to issue decree-laws. 
At the same time, the members of the Cabinet can maintain their status as elected PLC members.  
2.9. Constitutionalist Government  
While there is no consensus on what constitutionalism means, it is possible to suggest a 
definition that perceives constitutionalism as a set of theoretical claims with normative content 
about the kind of limited state – not only the kind of limited government – we adopt.7 A 
constitutionalist government is not just any kind of government, but instead a government that 
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departs from, for example, an egalitarian and non-discriminatory basis. It also departs from an 
acceptance of the idea that individuals enjoy basic rights and freedoms that are theirs as human 
beings. Based on the approach of governance as government, it is arguably the kind of system 
that was largely put in place in the PA.  
2.10. Liberal Government  
The Basic Law is often referred to as one of the ‘most liberal’ constitutions in the Arab World. 
Since it was adopted years before the so-called Arab Spring, many commentators were looking 
at the Basic Law with amazement. The character of the constitution as liberal is largely the result 
of the inclusion of a rather generous list of rights and freedoms, which are also rendered 
justiciabile – where justiciability refers to “the ability to claim a remedy before an independent 
and impartial body when a violation of a right has occurred or is likely to occur”8 – through the 
control of the constitutionality of law and the government’s actions by a ‘Supreme Constitutional 
Court’. 
III. Governance as Effective Control   
This second approach to governance departs from what I call here ‘governance as effective 
control’ – to distinguish it from the first approach of governance as government.  
The concept of ‘effective control governance’ departs from the elephant in the room: the ugly 
‘leviathan’ of the extraordinary and the exception behind the beautiful face of normality and the 
ordinary. In other words, the power behind governmental authorities – i.e. the ‘state’ – which is 
not used here to refer to sovereign nation states as per public international law. Instead, the state 
here refers to that ‘entity’ that is in the background whenever we talk about government; to that 
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‘legal order’ that monopolizes the ‘legitimate’ use of force; to that ‘unity, stability and existence’ 
that is being protected, valorized and given priority over any other principles of government.  
Positivist and realist approaches help to individualize the characteristics of government in a 
similar way to glasses helping individuals to better see their surroundings – regardless of whether 
the clear view they see is that of a real world or not. This second approach to governance as 
‘effective control’ is instead a panoramic view, from the sky, with the help of a telescope. While 
harmony, clarity and unity are the characteristics of surroundings that are viewed with the help of 
glasses, the panoramic view through a telescope does not show unity and harmony, but rather 
plurality and diversity.  
As such, assuming the unity of the legal order as a point of departure for the analysis of 
governance and constitutionalism, is at best aspirational and at worse misleading. Instead, in this 
section, ‘pluralism’ will be used as point of departure for the discussion of ‘governance as 
effective control’. While there are of course differences in the way pluralism is used in legal and 
social studies, for example to refer to possible variety in interpretations, or normative pluralism, 
state-legal pluralism or legal pluralism, in what follows ‘legal pluralism’ will be used in this 
alternative approach to the understanding of legal and constitutional phenomena in Palestine. As 
such, it is suggested that the place of written constitutions and their role in governance-related 
decision-making needs to be revisited
9
. 
 
3.1. A Fragmented Government  
Palestine was first divided into three political units following the end of the British Mandate in 
1947-8. The state of Israel was established as a result of the war over most of historic Palestine.
10
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Gaza and the West Bank were under two different administrations and received completely 
different treatments by Egyptian and Jordanian authorities respectively. The Israeli occupation 
maintained the legal and administrative fragmentation of the two areas, dealing with them as two 
separate entities under two separate military and civil administrations (as well as separate ID 
systems). East Jerusalem received different treatment too, as separate from the rest of occupied 
Palestinian territory.  
With the Oslo Agreements, Israel intensified the permits regime and dealt with Gazans in the 
West Bank as ‘foreigners’ who needed a permit to remain in this region (and vice versa). The 
unilateral withdrawal from Gaza was undertaken without coordination with the PA. Israel then 
declared Gaza Strip as ‘enemy territory’, which resulted in a much more restrictive regime of 
entry and exit to and from the Gaza Strip.  
The Hamas coup in Gaza in 2007 is accordingly not out of context. It simply makes sense. It is 
incorrect to suggest that it was the result of a Hamas-Fatah dichotomy or even that it was a fight 
over power and government alone. Structurally, it is more than that. Since 2007, Hamas controls 
Gaza and the PA, under President Abbas, controls the West Bank. The ‘consensus government’ 
under PA Prime Minister, Rami Hamdallah, does not govern Gaza despite the good and declared 
intentions of both factions.  
It is worth mentioning, however, that the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip did not put an 
end to Israel’s direct control of Gaza’s airspace, sea and land borders (with the exception of one 
of Gaza’s access points, the Rafah Crossing, which is managed by Egyptian authorities).  
As for the West Bank, Israel still controls (directly or indirectly) almost every aspect of the lives 
of the Palestinians who reside there. The Oslo Agreements divided the West Bank into areas A, 
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B, and C. Area C is completely under Israeli civil and military control. In Area B, services are 
provided by the PA, but security is under direct (Israeli) military control. Area A is under 
complete PA control, although Israel maintains the right to enter any part of the area to directly 
enforce military orders and decisions whenever a ‘security’ matter is at stake. 
The fragmentation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the stripping of East Jerusalem, and the 
division into Areas A, B, and C, coupled with the building of settlements that never stopped but 
instead intensified after the Oslo Agreements, has rendered the two-state solution impossible. 
The alternative is not necessarily a one-state solution – as we will see below.  
3.2. A De-Concentrated Government  
The governance of the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the Oslo Agreements is more fragmented 
than ever before. This is despite the fact that the PA never recognized, and in reality always 
contested, the fragmentation of occupied Palestinian territory, the dispersion of the Palestinian 
people, and the variety of legal regimes to which they are subjected as being part of a colonial 
and occupation project. Indeed, a PA minister from Gaza needs an Israeli permit to cross to the 
West Bank and vice versa. Accordingly, way before the 2007 split, if a minister is running his 
ministry from the Gaza Strip, a vice minister or a director general is, in reality, administering the 
ministry’s affairs in the West Bank, and vice versa. If the chairperson of a security force is in the 
West Bank, his vice chairperson is often managing this force in Gaza, and vice versa. 
The de-concentration of public services became the rule as a result of restrictions on the 
movement of Palestinians between West Bank cities during the second Intifada. As it was very 
difficult to reach Ramallah (the center of PA ministries), PA travel documents, for example, 
could from then onwards be issued in many other cities in the West Bank.  
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As for municipalities, and as a result of the 2007 split, a new decree-law was adopted which 
further restricted the autonomy of the municipalities (in the West Bank), making it possible for 
the Minister of Local Governance to substitute elected municipal council members with 
appointed ones. In other words, there was a decrease in the concentration of services and an 
increase in political centralization (including, but not limited to, an increase of control over 
possible international foreign aid required to pass through centralized PA offices). 
3.3. A Personally defined government  
The PA does not have an exclusively territorial jurisdiction as one may expect. It is always 
defined by person and/or function, including in Area A. As a matter of fact, the Oslo Agreements 
explicitly exclude any jurisdiction of the PA (referred to as the ‘Council’) over Israeli citizens 
(including, of course, Arab/Palestinian citizens of Israel). Palestinians with Jerusalem ID cards 
are not formally excluded from the jurisdiction of the PA. However, it is impossible for the PA 
to enforce the decisions of the Palestinian courts (in cases involving Palestinians from East 
Jerusalem) or to exercise police power over them (i.e. a criminal with a Jerusalem ID is often 
submitted to Israeli authorities). It is, for example, almost impossible for the Palestinian police 
forces to issue or enforce a traffic ticket to East Jerusalem residents in the ‘Area A’ city of 
Ramallah.  
3.4. A dependent Government  
Functionally also, the PA is limited to those functions explicitly transferred to it by Israeli 
military and civil administrations as a result of the Oslo Accords, or subsequent agreements or 
understandings. Those functions that are not transferred remain exclusively for the Israeli 
military and civil administration to determine. For example, all issues related to foreign 
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commerce and exchange are subject to Israeli unilateral control. The Paris Protocol is an 
example of a bilateral agreement that institutionalizes one-directional dependency of the PA on 
Israel, as a result of the continuous and exclusive Israeli control of the entry and exit points of 
the occupied Palestinian territory.  
After the unilateral withdrawal of Israel from most of the Gaza Strip, an agreement was reached 
whereby an EU police mission served as a neutral observer of the implementation of an 
arrangement that enabled only authorized individuals (i.e. with an Israeli pre-approved ID) to 
enter Gaza. The borders were supposed to be observed by Israel through closed-circuit cameras. 
When Hamas came to power in 2006, the EU police force left the Rafah border. Since then, 
Egypt has unilaterally decided on entry and exit through this crossing point – while most passage 
of goods and persons took place through tunnels.  
ID numbers for Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip are still issued following Israeli 
approved procedures and rules. The PA cannot offer an ID number for Palestinian expatriates 
unless it is obtained through the procedure of family unification – subject to Israeli pre-approval. 
For example, many Palestinian refugees from Syria – who are stateless – are currently living in 
difficult conditions in Jordan and Lebanon. However, they are not able to cross the border to the 
West Bank or Gaza Strip, because they do not – and cannot – have an Israeli-approved ID 
number for Palestinians. Accordingly they need Israeli-approved permits, which are of course 
impossible to obtain for Palestinian refugees fleeing Syria.  
Gazans in the West Bank still need a special permit from Israel (and Jordan) to use the Allenby 
Bridge (which is the unique entry point for Palestinians with ID to the West Bank). Entry and 
exit of goods to and from the West Bank is also under exclusive and direct Israeli control.  
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The movement of Palestinians (including their leadership, such as PA President, Mahmoud 
Abbas, or Prime Minister Rami Hamdalla) from one city to another (say, from Ramallah to 
Nablus), is subject to Israeli jurisdiction (as they pass through Area C). The same rule applies 
when they travel outside the West Bank, say to London, where they need to pass through the 
Israeli-controlled Allenby Bridge to Jordan, and then to London, through Jordan’s Queen Alia 
International Airport. It should be noted that since the second Intifada, travel restrictions have 
been imposed on Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip prohibiting their use of Ben 
Gurion airport in Israel (while at the same time forbidding the construction of an airport in the 
West Bank and destroying the one that existed in the Gaza Strip).  
3.5. Authoritarian Government  
The term authoritarian regime refers to the rule “through strict, intrusive, and violent 
enforcement of law”11. It is used here as the opposite of a democratic regime.  
Despite the appearance of democracy, the PA inherited authoritarian legacies from the past. 
These are the PLO legacy on the one hand, and Israeli military legacy on the other. Although 
most of the comments below are about the post-2007 coup, authoritarian government 
characteristics can be found in the PA from its establishment onwards. One example is the 
establishment of the so-called ‘state security courts’ which are in reality (Palestinian) military 
courts that apply (PLO) military rules on (Palestinian) civilians, sometimes even for crimes that 
are not military in nature. Palestinian military courts are still in place and apply laws that have 
been in force since the 1970s, without the minimum of respect for due process (e.g. there is no 
right to appeal, even in cases where the sentence is the death penalty).  
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After the 2007 coup, President Mahmoud Abbas used emergency power in order to suspend 
some of the Basic Law provisions and appointed an ‘emergency government’ which remained in 
place beyond the one-month limit of a state of emergency. More than a hundred decree-laws 
have been issued since then, and the cabinet has acted as an executive authority accountable to 
the president alone. Even when Abbas ratified international human rights treaties, he did so 
arbitrarily. At the same time, the status of rights and freedoms has generally deteriorated while 
most of the PA budget (which depends on foreign aid) goes towards salaries for civil servants 
and security personnel. In Gaza, techniques of governance have varied, but the authoritarian 
approach to government is the same. Hamas has ruled every aspect of the lives of Palestinian in 
Gaza, whether it is related to aspects of ‘public morality’ in society or the use of missiles to 
attack nearby Israeli settlements and towns. The so-called ‘informal economy’ which depends on 
smuggling goods and persons to and from Gaza through tunnels, was arguably under the more or 
less strict scrutiny and regulation of Hamas.  
Not to forget that the Israeli military governs the regions under its control in an authoritarian 
way. Indeed, the Israeli military commander rules these areas through orders, micromanaging the 
behaviors of the population through prohibitions and permissions. He enforces his orders through 
the Israeli army and military courts – which apply Israeli military rules to Palestinian civilians. 
Thousands are put into prison, some without charges, as they are detained administratively and 
often with the use of secret evidence. As a general rule of government under the Israeli 
authoritarian regime in the West Bank: all is forbidden unless permitted by the Israeli military 
commander or by an authorized military officer.  
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3.6. Minority Government  
The PA was governed throughout its history mostly by governments that were not representative 
of the whole population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 1994, the first appointed Council of 
the PA was nominated by Yaser Arafat. It included PLO officials from the Diaspora. In 1996, 
Hamas and other factions did not participate in the PLC elections. Accordingly, the government 
enjoyed the confidence of a PLC composed mostly of Fatah members or sympathizers.  In 2006, 
elections resulted in victory for Hamas in the majority of PLC seats. However, Hamas was not 
able to govern (as a result of the boycott by the Quartet, the international donor community, 
Israel, and arguably by Fatah itself – who refused (at least initially) to form a unity government 
with Hamas).  
In early 2007, the Saudi-brokered ‘Mecca Deal’ almost imposed a ‘unity government’ - it only 
survived for few months before the Hamas coup later in the same year. Since June 2007, the PA 
has been governed by what some call a ‘minority government’ where the president and the 
government do not enjoy a majority in the PLC – which is not capable of convening anyway. 
Gaza PLC deputies continue to convene without having the necessary majority for legitimate law 
making based on the procedures of the Basic Law. Theoretically, however, the Basic Law is still 
invoked as the source of governmental powers in both areas.  
3.7. Dictatorship  
Since the British Mandate, the legacy of successive governments in Palestine, or in parts of it, 
and in varying degrees, was that of the concentration of all powers in the hands of one person, 
whether the British high commissioner of Palestine, the Egyptian military, the then civilian 
administrator – the Jordanian King – or the Israeli military commander. Arafat also established 
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the basis for dictatorship by making use of his many prerogatives as PLO executive committee 
chairman, head of Fatah, president of the state of Palestine (declared in Algiers in 1988), interior 
minister (until 2001), and prime minister (until 2003); not to mention his personal charisma and 
legacy as a ‘liberation fighter’. Indeed, when he was pushed to assign the title of interior minister 
to someone else, he established by decree a ‘National Security Council’ – which he of course 
chaired – thereby monopolizing the appointment of the majority of its members.  
The short period that followed the election of Mahmoud Abbas as the head of the PA was 
promising, as succession was peaceful, and scrupulously followed the Basic Law provisions. 
However, following the victory of Hamas in 2006, Abbas started to apply Arafat’s past 
techniques by referring to the PLO as a source of his legitimacy (as he was also the chairman of 
the PLO) and to its institutions as a source of authority (in particular the PLO Central Council 
which convened several times to support Abbas’ agenda).  
In reality, what has taken place since the election of Abbas in 2005 is a revival of a concentration 
of powers in the hands of the president. When Arafat was persona non grata, the international 
community wanted him to share powers with a prime minister (the person who enjoyed the 
support of the international community at the time was Mahmoud Abbas, who also became the 
first prime minister). However, after Abbas gained power in 2005, and in particular when Hamas 
won the elections in 2006 and formed a Hamas-led government under Prime Minister Ismail 
Haniyeh, this trend reversed. The international community encouraged a re-concentration of all 
powers in the hands of the president (who was perceived as a pro-peace leader) through direct 
control of the security apparatus, finance, and the monopoly over foreign policy and relations 
(including negotiation and coordination with Israel).  
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Since Hamas gained power, the president has nominated many ‘advisors’ for all aspects of 
government, thereby, in reality, running the PA through his own advisors and not through the 
Hamas-led government. Since 2007, the PA government has been the president’s executive arm. 
The president’s power to nominate the chief justice has also been helpful in maintaining control 
of the judiciary. Control of the syndicates and unions was also used – with the help of Fatah and 
Fatah sympathizers – after outlawing Hamas military or civil activities in the West Bank by 
decree.  
 
3.8. President’s Government  
Since the establishment of the PA, the PA government has literally been the president’s 
government. The president acted as prime minister until the office of the prime minister was first 
introduced in the amendment of the Basic Law in 2003. However, the procedure for the 
nomination of the prime minister by the president – which then requires the confidence of the 
PLC – as well as the prime minister’s responsibility towards the president (as much as it is 
towards the PLC) enhanced the view that, despite the existence of a prime minister, the PA 
government is the president’s government.  
The cohabitation of the president and the Hamas-led government did not function. The president 
issued decree laws and the government issued orders, without reciprocal consultation or the need 
for co-signature to ensure, for example, coherence within the executive branch of government. 
Indeed, in reality the Basic Law did not forbid this. Since the 2007 coup, again, the government 
has functioned without a vote of confidence by the PLC – which still has not convened. Instead, 
it is the president who controls the nomination of the prime minister and every detail related to 
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the formation of the government and the dismissal of one or more ministers – almost by 
instructing the prime minister on what to do or not to do.  
3.9. Tyrannical Government  
A tyranny is a very harsh qualification of government. However, I suggest that, despite the 
appearance of legality – such as the issuing of military orders and declarations, as well as the 
establishment of military courts – Israeli military commanders have enjoyed almost absolute 
power over the Palestinians since 1967, using excessive force that was often cruel and mostly 
unjust
12
.  
Since 2007, Hamas’ rule of Gaza can also be described as tyrannical due to the lack of any 
limitations to the power exercised by Hamas and its leadership. Since 2007, there have also been 
reports about PA mistreatment of prisoners in Palestinian prisons. In the West Bank, the 
president’s rule of the West Bank is moving towards a tyrannical form of government, if it is not 
already. 
 
3.10. A ‘Neo-Liberal’ Government  
Since the 2007 coup, the president has nominated ‘technocrats’ in government and not political 
affiliates, leading to the idea that PA governments consist of managers, rather than politicians.  
While the status of rights and freedoms has generally been deteriorating as a result of restrictions 
imposed since the declaration of the state of emergency in 2007, Salam Fayyad has started a 
policy of economic and financial development within the framework of building institutions of 
the state under – and despite – the occupation. This policy eventually failed, but his ‘neo-liberal’ 
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policies have remained in place. The term is used here with its negative connotations of market 
rules prevailing and resulting in the reinforcement of unjust inequalities in society.  
The sense of public good and community decreased. Likewise, the solidarity between 
Palestinians also decreased. The Paris Protocol refers to a common market with Israel which is in 
reality one-directional and which serves Israeli financial and economic interests. The efforts to 
open up the PA to international investment and foreign trade have remained marginal due to 
restrictive Israeli policies. At the same time, monopolies of basic goods have flourished in the 
PA territories as a result of the kind of structure that has been created since the Oslo Accords in 
the occupied Palestinian territory.   
 
IV. A ‘Flexible’ Governance  
The ‘governance as effective control’ approach has complicated the discussion about governance 
and the constitution, particularly when compared to the rosy picture created by the ‘governance 
as government’ approach. The latter approach is, however, not conclusive, as in reality it does 
not help answer the question about who really governs the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In which 
case, how do we proceed?  
I suggest that the problem lies with the initial assumption about governance and constitutions. So 
far, the point of departure has either been the government or the ‘state’. At the basis of both 
approaches is either the idea of an authoritative government, as a result of a constitution, or a 
legal government, as a result of effective control. Both approaches do not help capture the 
dynamics of governance in Palestine, because they are both up-down approaches to governance. 
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In addition, in this paper we have so far addressed constitutional and legal systems assuming 
their unity and certainty, their hierarchically organized norms, under a supreme constitution, or 
within the framework of a territory or a state. But in reality, the constitutional system in Palestine 
is anything but unity, territoriality, harmony, hierarchy, and coherence. It is a matrix of laws, 
rules, orders, norms and institutions that cannot be truly captured unless we switch our concern 
from the government to the governed, from the state to the individual, from power to liberties.  
In other words, instead of asking ‘who governs Palestine’, the question becomes: how are 
people’s choices governed and how are their rights exercised and their liberties curbed. The least 
obvious answer is: it depends!  
I suggest that, despite the many details that go beyond the focus of this paper, the answers to the 
above questions depend to a large extent on what I will here call the ‘three Ws’: ‘Who’, ‘Where’ 
and ‘What’ (or otherwise stated, the answer depends on a mix of personal, territorial and 
functional aspects). If for example, the individual we are talking about happens to be an Israeli 
citizen, the law and protection of the state of Israel, and the jurisdiction of the Israeli courts 
follow him/her in any part of Israel and in any part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The PA has 
no jurisdiction whatsoever over Israeli citizens.   
In what follows, I will show what I call the ‘legal matrix’ of governance in which Palestinians 
live, by giving an example from the daily life of Palestinians
13
. Let’s imagine a British citizen 
called Smith. He is visiting his four friends who live in the West Bank city of Ramallah (Sarah, 
Rami, Fatima, and George). Here is how their daily life looks. 
 
 
Working Paper – submitted by the author to ISMC’s Dialogues Series 2015-6 
 
23 
 
 Sarah Rami Fatima George Smith 
What does the 
name tell us?  
Female, who 
could be 
Christian or 
Muslim 
Male, who could 
be Christian or 
Muslim  
Female, Muslim  Male, Christian Male foreigner, 
no idea about the 
religion from the 
name.  
Religion  Christian 
(Catholic) (1 of 
13 Christian 
communities)  
Muslim (Sunni, 
the only 
recognized 
Muslim 
denomination)  
Muslim (Sunni) Christian (Greek 
Orthodox)  
It doesn’t matter 
Where are they 
from exactly? 
East Jerusalem  Ramallah (his 
family are 
originally 
refugees from 
Jaffa). 
Haifa (her 
parents were 
born in Haifa 
when part of 
historic 
Palestine)  
Gaza Strip  It doesn’t matter 
Which ID do 
they have? 
ID card for 
inhabitants of 
East Jerusalem 
ID card for the 
West Bank  
Israeli 
citizenship 
(‘Arab Israeli’) 
ID card for the 
Gaza Strip  
UK Passport  
Can they live in 
the West Bank 
city of 
Ramallah? 
YES, but they 
risk losing their 
ID number and 
(Israeli) health 
insurance if 
‘caught’ living 
outside 
Jerusalem 
YES NO NO, unless they 
have a permit 
issued by the 
Israeli civil 
administration 
(change of 
residence) 
YES 
Who can they 
marry? 
Rami: YES 
(with a special 
permit from 
church 
authorities) 
George: YES 
Sarah: YES – 
she doesn’t need 
to change 
religion as 
Muslim males 
can marry a 
Christian or a 
Jew)  
Fatima: YES 
Rami: YES 
George: NO 
(forbidden by 
personal status 
law). So?
1
 
Sarah: YES  
Fatima: YES 
(with a permit 
from church 
authorities) 
 
Hereditary 
matters decided 
by? 
Catholic tribunal 
(Jerusalem) 
Shari’a court 
(Ramallah) 
Shari’a court 
(Jerusalem) 
Orthodox 
tribunal 
(Jerusalem)  
He can choose 
Which Personal Catholic Canon Personal Status Personal Status Orthodox Canon He can choose 
                                                 
1
 At least five options are possible:  
a) George may convert to Islam; he registers his new religion and gets married to Fatima, based on shari’a law.  
b) Fatima converts to Christianity and gets married to George in church. However, she cannot change her religion, 
nor can she register her marriage, in state civil affairs.   
c) Fatima may stay Muslim and marry George (after obtaining permission from church authorities); however, she 
cannot register her marriage in state civil affairs.  
d) Fatima and George go to Cyprus and get married there, and then return and register their marriage in a foreign 
country based on reciprocity clauses.  
e) Fatima and George forget about it, and do not get married at all.  
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Status Law 
applies to them? 
 
Law (Vatican) Law (Jordanian) Law (Jordanian) Law  
What is the 
source for 
hereditary rules?  
Shari’a law (she 
is entitled to half 
of what her 
brother inherits)
2
  
Shari’a law Shari’a law (she 
is entitled to half 
of what her 
brother inherits) 
Shari’a law (it is 
not clear 
whether the 
unequal 
distribution of 
hereditary is 
maintained by 
the Israeli High 
Court 
He can choose 
What car can 
they own or 
drive? 
Yellow license 
plate car (with 
Israeli flag) 
Green license 
plate car (with 
ف, for Palestine)  
Yellow license 
plate car (with 
Israeli flag) 
Green license 
plate card (with 
ف, for Palestine) 
He can choose 
Can they import 
cars? 
YES: they pay 
Israeli customs 
only 
YES: they pay 
Israeli and PA 
customs  
YES: they pay 
Israel customs 
only 
YES: they pay 
Israeli and PA 
customs 
YES: he can 
choose which 
kind of car (and 
pay the customs 
accordingly)  
Which traffic 
police force can 
issue them a 
ticket?  
Ramallah: PA 
police, but they 
cannot enforce it  
Area C: Israeli 
police 
Ramallah: PA 
police and they 
can enforce it  
Area C: Israeli 
police 
Ramallah: PA 
police, but they 
cannot enforce it  
Area C: Israeli 
police 
Ramallah: PA 
police and they 
can enforce it  
Area C: Israeli 
police 
Ramallah: PA 
police, but they 
cannot enforce it  
Area C: Israeli 
police 
Can they enter 
Jerusalem with 
his/her car? 
YES NO  YES NO YES for yellow 
license plate car  
NO for green 
license plate car  
Do they need a 
personal permit 
to enter 
Jerusalem? 
NO YES: Issued by 
Israeli civil 
administration 
NO YES: Issued by 
Israeli civil 
administration 
NO: if he has a 
visa  
Yes: if he has an 
entry permit to 
the West Bank  
How do they 
cross the 
Qalandia entry 
point to 
Jerusalem? 
In personal car, 
taxi or bus (with 
a yellow license 
plate) 
He has to walk 
through the 
checkpoint 
In personal car, 
taxi or bus (with 
a yellow license 
plate) 
He has to walk 
through the 
checkpoint 
In personal car, 
taxi or bus (with 
a yellow license 
plate) 
Can they work 
in Jerusalem? 
YES  NO (unless with 
special 
permission from 
the Israeli civil 
administration) 
YES  NO (unless with 
special 
permission from 
the Israeli civil 
administration) 
YES (with 
permission from 
the Israeli 
ministry of 
labor) 
Can they stay 
the night in 
YES NO YES NO YES 
                                                 
2
 Informal social norms often pressurize women into give up all their hereditary rights, regardless of religion 
Working Paper – submitted by the author to ISMC’s Dialogues Series 2015-6 
 
25 
 
Jerusalem? 
How do they 
travel abroad? 
Israeli issued 
Laissez-Passer  
PA travel 
document (with 
an Israeli pre-
approved ID 
number on it)  
Israeli passport  PA travel 
document (with 
an Israeli pre-
approved ID 
number on it)  
UK passport  
Which exit 
points do they 
use to leave the 
country? 
Ben Gurion 
airport or the 
Allenby bridge 
The Allenby 
Bridge  
Ben Gurion 
airport or the 
Sheikh Hussein 
crossing point 
The Allenby 
Bridge (provided 
they have both 
an  Israeli and a 
Jordanian 
permit) 
Anywhere: Ben 
Gurion airport, 
the Allenby 
Bridge or the 
Sheikh Hussein 
crossing  
Which hall can 
they use at the 
Allenby bridge? 
 
The hall for 
foreigners  
The hall for 
Palestinians  
They cannot use 
the Allenby 
bridge 
The hall for 
Palestinians 
The hall for 
foreigners  
Can they re-
enter the 
country? 
YES (within the 
three-year 
validity of the 
Laissez Passer) 
YES YES  YES (with both 
Israeli and 
Jordanian 
permits) 
UK passport: 
any entry point 
with a visa or 
permit.   
If he also has a 
West Bank or 
Gaza ID: then 
only via the 
Allenby Bridge 
using his ID 
Who controls 
their passports at 
the country’s 
exit and entry 
points? 
Israeli 
authorities 
Israeli 
authorities 
Israeli 
authorities 
Israeli 
authorities 
Israeli 
authorities 
Do they need to 
check in at the 
PA offices in 
Jericho when 
they return? 
NO YES NO YES NO 
 
Based on the above, the governing body is different depending on the area in which the 
individual concerned is present (Areas A, B, C; East Jerusalem or Gaza) but also on the kind of 
ID s/he holds. Regarding some issues (such as marriage) religion matters. For other matters, 
different factors determine the governance structure that applies.  
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This ‘legal matrix’, as I like to call it, is very complex for outsiders, and is in reality very 
confusing and subject to (often arbitrary) changes. These changes are often first experienced by 
Palestinians in person, or are heard about from other people who were unfortunate enough to 
discover that the rules and procedures had changed. In other words, most rules-like provisions 
that govern Palestinians are unpredictable. For Palestinians, however, knowing these rules and 
procedures is not a luxury. It is necessary for their daily lives, their basic needs, in sum: their 
survival.  
For example, Smith may find it difficult to distinguish between Areas A, B and C. If he goes by 
car with his four Palestinian friends, he will probably know – as is often jokingly said – that they 
entered Area C (which is under strict Israeli army/police control) because everybody put on their 
seatbelts. If Smith drives the car, his Palestinian friends will shout at him if he – inadvertently – 
takes a street (with no specific sign prohibiting him or his Palestinian friends from entering that 
street) which leads to a settlement in Area C, or if he does not stop at a fixed or ‘flying’ – (as 
they are often called by Palestinians) Israeli checkpoint.  
While waiting at the checkpoint for a security check, Smith’s Palestinian friends may advise him 
to join the line for yellow license plate cars (even if there is no sign to indicate this), and avoid 
the long waiting time in the line for green license plate cars (where fellow Palestinians, who 
happen to be driving green license plate cars, are). If Smith drives his car in Area A, his friends 
may tell him to ignore the PA policeman – who is unable to enforce even traffic laws to drivers 
of yellow license plate cars. If Smith has an accident and kills a pedestrian in Area C, his 
Palestinian friends will tell him which police force to expect, which court he will be judged in, 
and which law will apply.  
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In other words, rather than answering the question of who governs Palestine, the answer largely 
depends on each specific case; where the constitution is not known in advance. This does not 
mean that it is unknown, but rather that one can only say, case by case, with more or less 
confidence: ‘I’ll know it when I see it.’  
 
V. Conclusion  
I started this paper by asking ‘who governs the West Bank and Gaza Strip’. I discussed the up-
down approaches which I considered as misleading and instead suggested a case by case 
approach, where governance is better understood from the perspective of the governed 
individual, their existence, and their rights and liberties.   
I can now safely conclude that: 
1) The PA is not the only authority that governs the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It is not 
always precise to consider the PA – as some tend to do – as a sub-government, 
subordinate to the Israeli military commander. In reality, despite the upper hand kept by 
the Israeli military – in particular regarding ‘security issues’ – the PA enjoys autonomous 
prerogatives in certain areas that are enforced directly by the PA without the need for 
coordination with Israel. Of course, many other prerogatives are still subject to obligatory 
coordination, pre-approval or confirmation by the Israeli authorities.  
2) The Basic Law is only one of the many bases for governance in Palestine. Not only is it 
of no value regarding the Israeli military and civil administration, it is also not always the 
source of all the powers exercised within the PA’s West Bank or Hamas’ Gaza. 
Alternative sources include Israeli military orders, the PLO charter, the Hamas charter, 
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Islamic shari’a and various international treaties that apply in time of peace or 
occupation. As a source of authority, the Basic Law is not that useful. In fact, it forms 
part of the problem that has contributed to reaching a deadlock in the Palestinian political 
system. 
3) The transition to dictatorship and the authoritarian character of government in the PA has 
nothing to do with culture or religion – as is often assumed regarding Palestinians and 
Arabs, and indeed Muslims more generally. The PA has inherited legacies from the past 
that are based on the concentration of powers. As such, discussions about the possible 
reasons for this transition should focus on power relations, structural issues, and the 
interests of foreign countries as well as local political and economic elites.  
4) There has been a tendency to blame people for electing Hamas in 2006 (and to blame 
democratic elections in general) as the cause of all the troubles that followed – in 
particular following the 2007 coup. While Hamas and Fatah are to blame, other factors 
played a major role in the deadlock between Palestinian factions, including the 
international donor community, and Israel.  
5) Arguably, there is a problem with the way Hamas was integrated into the political system 
in the first place. Their participation was possible after agreeing to amend the Basic Law 
(in 2005), where elections became regularized to every four years for the PLC and the 
Presidency. The electoral system was also amended. In other words, rather than having 
Hamas accept the Basic Law as supreme law (and arguably, the assumptions on which 
the Basic Law is built, such as the idea of the two-state vision or the Israeli-Palestinian 
Accords), the Basic Law was amended to accommodate Hamas. As such, there was no 
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formal commitment by Hamas to the democratic process – aimed at giving priority to 
politics and compromise, instead of the decisions by unilateral factions. Similar fears 
were present in Algiers and Egypt due to the participation of ‘Islamic parties’ in the 
elections. Their participation was perceived – not necessarily correctly – as aiming to 
destroy democracy from within.  
6) It is often the case that the PA is presented as an achievement. The international 
community and Israel have a vested interest in maintaining the PA as much as the 
Palestinian leadership does. In other words, the dissolution of the PA was never really an 
option – even if some academics and politicians called for it, or at least used this as a 
threat. In reality, the status quo will probably remain as it is – with possible 
intensification of the fragmentation that may lead to different arrangements for Gaza, 
separate from the West Bank. With time, the structure of the PA may change with 
increased dependency on Israel and the international community. This will intensify the 
need for coordination with Israel.  
7) Contrary to prevailing narratives about the indispensability of the PA, I argue that it 
never really governed the West Bank and Gaza Strip (putting aside direct and indirect 
Israeli control). This is certainly the case regarding personal status affairs which have 
remained as they are in terms of informal and tribal justice, the lack of unification in most 
important legislation - such as civil and penalty codes - and the maintenance of local 
authorities (municipalities) and committees (such as in refugee camps). This change of 
perspective aims at switching the narrative about the PA: it is not whether the PA will 
stay as a governing body; the question is how long it can maintain the little control it 
currently has.  
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